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1 Introduction 
Human resource management (HRM) has been defined as the “process of attracting, developing and 
maintaining a talented and energetic workforce to support organizational mission, objectives, and 
strategies” (Schermerhorn, 2001, p. 2400). Audretsch and Thurik (2000, 2001) argue that effective 
HRM practices are becoming increasingly important in the modern “knowledge-based” economy, as 
companies face the double challenge of the need for more highly trained employees coupled with the 
shortage of qualified labour. These challenges, coupled with the third trend toward smaller firms in gen-
eral, reinforce the need for effective HRM practices in the small firm (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000, 
2001). 
 
Empirical research confirms that in general, smaller firms make less use of professional HRM practices 
than larger firms (Barron et al., 1987; Hornsby and Kuratko, 1990). For example, smaller firms make less 
use of formalized recruitment practices (Aldrich and Langton, 1997), provide less training to their em-
ployees (Koch and McGrath, 1996; Westhead and Storey, 1997, 1999) and are less likely to use formal-
ized performance appraisals (Jackson et al., 1989). In spite of the size effect, a growing base of research 
evidence suggests that far from being homogeneous, small firms nevertheless vary widely in the profes-
sional HRM practices in use (De Kok and Uhlaner, 2001). For example, Deshpande and Golhar (1994) 
find HRM practices within many small manufacturing firms to be as sophisticated as those in larger 
companies. Similarly, Hornsby and Kuratko (1990) find that while firms of all sizes use primarily informal 
recruitment and selection techniques (mainly employee referrals and the interview), even among small 
firms, HRM practices are often more sophisticated than they had expected. Using a small set of cases, 
Hill and Stewart (1999) also demonstrate variation in level of sophistication of HRM practices among 
smaller organizations. 
 
Variation in family ownership and management may help to explain the differences in HRM practices 
among SMEs. Although Dyer (2003) and Schulze et al. (2003) both point out that family is a neglected 
variable in organizational research, a research stream is emerging that generally confirms a negative re-
lationship between family firm governance and the use of professional HRM practices (Aldrich and Lang-
ton, 1997; Fiegener, et al., 1996; Reid and Adams, 2001; Cyr, Johnson, and Welbourne, 2000). In this 
paper, we pursue this research stream further by deriving and testing a model to explain whether and 
why family-owned and -managed firms tend to use fewer professional HRM practices than other SMEs. 
In developing the propositions of the model, we compare and contrast predictions and explanations 
based on agency theory with those based on a resource-based view. We argue that the direct effect of 
family ownership and management on types of HRM practices found in SMEs is more consistent with 
agency theory whereas indirect effects, via various organization characteristics variables associated with 
greater organizational complexity and resource richness, may support a resource based view of the firm. 
The organization characteristics chosen for the present study include firm size, formal business planning, 
HRM specialization, and export strategy, thus representing a mix of contextual and structural character-
istics (Daft, 1998). In addition, we control for other organization characteristics such as firm age, sector, 
unionisation and franchising. Before presenting the methodology and results of an empirical study of 
approximately 700 SMEs, we will review aspects the literature which provide conceptual support for the 
proposed model and hypotheses. 
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2  Family ownership and management and professional 
HRM practices: Empirical and theoretical perspectives 
2.1 Introduction 
Research on HRM practices dates back to the early decades of the twentieth century (Scott, 1915). Be-
tween mid-century and the late 1970’s HRM research primarily focused on the development of valid and 
fair HRM practices in large organizations (Asher, 1972; Campbell et al, 1970; Ghiselli, 1966; Guion, 
1965) and sources of discrimination bias in hiring and promotion (Cann et al, 1981; Tenbrunsel et al, 
1996). More recent research examines the impact of HRM practices on organization-level performance 
measures generally (though not always) supporting a positive linkage between the two (Delery and 
Doty; 1996; Guest, 1997; Huselid, 1995; Huselid et al, 1997; Ichniowski et al, 1997; Koch and McGrath, 
1996; de Kok, 2001; Litz and Stewart, 2000; MacDuffie, 1995: Schulze et al, 2001; Schultze et al, 2003; 
Welbourne and Andrews, 1996; Wynarczyk, et al, 1993). 
 
Past research confirms a negative relationship between family ownership and/ management and profes-
sional HRM practices and expertise. For instance, Aldrich and Langton (1997) find a negative relation-
ship between the number of family members who work in a firm and formal HRM practices. Fiegener et 
al (1996) also confirm a negative relationship for promotion decisions. While non-family firms emphasize 
outside work experience and university training in promotion decisions, family firms rarely do so, in their 
study. Research by Reid and Adams (2001) confirms this pattern. In a study of Irish SMEs ranging in size 
from 20 to 100 employees, they find that family businesses are less likely to have professional HRM 
practices, including the use of references, appraisal systems, a peer appraisal process, training assess-
ment, or merit-based pay. 
 
Past researchers have drawn upon a wide variety of theories to explain the differences in professionalism 
of management and/or HRM practices between firms, and specifically between family and non-family-
owned firms. We will focus in this study on two theories in particular: agency theory and the resource-
based view. First, however, we will discuss what we mean with professional HRM practices. 
2.2  Professional HRM practices 
Researchers variously refer to certain sets of HRM practices influenced by the HRM profession as “best 
practice,” or “high-performance” (Huselid, 1995), “formal” (Aldrich and Langton, 1997; de Kok and 
Uhlaner, 2001; Heneman and Berkley, 1999), “sophisticated” (Golhar and Deshpande, 1997; Hornsby 
and Kuratko, 1990; Goss et al., 1994; Wagner, 1998) or as “professional” (Gnan and Songini, 2003; 
Matlay, 1999).The term, “high performance” has been used to describe management strategies found 
lined to higher performance in entrepreneurial firms (Chaganti, Chaganti, and Malone, 1991). This term 
has been adopted within HRM research as well. In particular, one of the lingering questions in HRM re-
search is whether or not there is a single set of policies or practices that represents a ‘universally supe-
rior approach’ to managing people (Chandler and McEvoy, 2000, p. 44). Theories on best practices or 
high commitment theories suggest that universally, certain HRM practices, either separately or in combi-
nation are associated with improved organizational performance. They maintain that well-paid, well-
motivated workers, working in an atmosphere of mutuality and trust, generate higher productivity gains 
and lower unit costs (Boxall, 1996; Lowe and Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer, 1994). Some empirical research sup-
ports this view.  For instance, Huselid (1995) reports from a sample of 968 firms that those using com-
prehensive employee recruitment and selection procedures, extensive employee involvement and train-
ing and formal performance appraisal approaches linked to incentives are likely to have lower employee 
turnover, higher productivity, and enhanced corporate financial performance. 
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Others, however, argue that a contingency approach is more likely to generate superior performance 
with empirical research also supporting this perspective (Lawler and Jenkins, 1992; Meyer, Tsui and Hin-
ings, 1993; Venkatraman, 1989; Gomez-Meijia and Balkin, 1992; Pilkington, 1998; Cappelli and 
Crocker-Heter, 1996). Research to date, though informative, does not unequivocally support either a 
best practices or a contingency view. Additional sampling is required to represent size, sector, and gov-
ernance structures more fully. In addition, these need to be tested for the full range of HRM practices. 
Due to the limitations of research to date, we have thus also decided to avoid such labels as “best prac-
tice” and “high performance” for a defined set of HRM practices as premature. 
 
Using the term, “formal”, with reference to HRM practices is also problematic. The term, formal, (and/or 
formalization) takes on multiple meanings in the literature, (e.g. whether a practice is written, standard-
ized and/or defined by the employer). See De Kok and Uhlaner, 2001. Certain HRM practices (e.g. use of 
psychological tests, performance pay, or referrals by employees) may be considered appropriate by ex-
perts but not necessarily formal, according to one or more of these definitions. Some researchers also 
use the term “sophisticated.” But the term lacks a clear operational definition distinct from professional-
ism. This leaves us with consideration of the term, “professional.”  In the present study, the HRM prac-
tices chosen for study are derived primarily from experts in the field of HRM, whether or not the practice 
has been empirically validated against performance indicators within SMEs. However, such practices 
typically conform to legal requirements and professional standards established in a number of advanced 
Western economies in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere (and listed in such standard-setting 
bodies as the Society for Human Resource Management in the United States). We thus feel that this 
term is the most suitable for the present research. 
2.3  Agency theory and the family firm 
Agency theory focuses on the principals (owners) and agents (managers) of a company. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of the principal’s monitoring expenditures, the agent’s 
bonding expenditures and the residual loss.
1 Agency theory has been used in compensation theory to 
explain the steps that the owner (i.e., the principal) can take to bring the interests of managers (i.e., 
agents) into alignment (e.g., Welbourne and Gomez-Mejia, 1995). Heneman and colleagues suggest 
that agency theory may also be useful for study of other HRM practices (Heneman et al., 2000).  
 
Steier (2003) applies agency theory to the family firm as follows: Since the owner (or principal) and 
manager (or agent) are typically part of the same family, monitoring, contracts or other coordination 
between the two should be more efficient and thus less expensive. If the owner and manager are one 
and the same, monitoring (of oneself) is obviously not even necessary, saving on agency costs. Randoy 
and Goel (2003) use this logic to assert that family firms may use more informal HRM practices to re-
duce costs and improve profitability. Pollack (1985) describes the potential advantages in the family-
owned firm: incentives to act in the long-term interests of the family, effective monitoring of work ac-
tivities, and selfless rationalities inherent in family grouping and loyalty to the family.  
 
But this is not always the case. There are of course, situations where a relative does not perform well 
and other family owner/managers may be more reluctant to take action against a relative than against a 
nonperforming nonrelative for fear of damaging family relations, even if it is bad for the business. 
Schulze et al (2003) refer to this latter phenomenon as a sort of altruism problem: a situation where the 
owner manager, by attempting to help other family members unintentionally and/or indirectly encour-
ages them to shirk their duties. But others argue that such altruism, though leading to negative per-
formance, does not necessarily change the impact of family firm governance on the types of monitoring 
1
 For a more detailed discussion of the agency relationship, the reader is referred to Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen and 
Meckling, (1976) and Steier (2003).   9 
devices used. For instance, Gomez-Mejia et al (2001) find that, even when faced with motivation and 
performance problems, families are often reluctant to monitor and discipline family members. Thus, 
even although Schulze et al (2001) do find a positive relationship within privately-held family firms be-
tween the use of monitoring systems and performance, this may not be due to increased agency costs. 
Greenwood (2003) argues by contrast that altruism may actually lower agency costs by removing the 
agency problem. In short, shirking and the altruistic behaviour it triggers may not necessarily alter the 
predicted direction of the effect: that owners of family-owned firms monitor agents less than do owners 
of non-family firms. 
 
Following these arguments, we argue that family firms have less of a need to monitor agents in the firm 
(via performance appraisal), especially when they are from the same family. Even if their work is ap-
praised, the basis for rewarding family employees is less likely to be related solely on their performance, 
and thus makes a professional compensation system also unnecessary. At least in smaller firms, recruit-
ment is also simplified to the extent that family members are chosen over non-family members. Since 
the family owner-manager’s expectations and goals influence the choice of HRM policy, it is thus seen 
as less likely that (especially smaller) family-firms will choose professional HRM policies. 
 
In addition, family ownership is associated with a desire to remain independent and keep full control 
over the organization (Blais and Toulouse, 1990; Bacon et al., 1996). Case-studies suggest that employ-
ers often associate professional HRM practices with a loss of control over (and flexibility of) the em-
ployee relations (Koch and De Kok, 1999). This would provide an additional explanation for a direct 
negative effect of family ownership and management on professional HRM practices. 
2.4  The family firm and the resource-based view 
An alternative explanation for the relationship between family ownership and management and profes-
sional HRM practices is grounded in the resource-based view of the firm. The resource-based view is 
based on the assumption that differences in physical, organizational and human resources between 
firms cause a fundamental heterogeneity in their productive potential. Given this heterogeneity, the 
long-term competitiveness of a company depends upon the resources that not only differentiate it from 
its competitors, but are also durable and difficult to imitate and substitute (Hansen and Wernerfelt, 
1989; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Barney, 1991; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Rangone, 1999; Priem 
and Butler, 2001). Resources are not meant only in the physical sense but refer to organizational capa-
bilities as well (Ulrich and Lake, 1991). Human resources are an important resource to generate sus-
tained competitive advantage through “facilitating the development of competencies that are firm-
specific (...) and generate tacit organizational knowledge” (Lado and Wilson, 1994, page 699). 
 
The resource-based view can be used to understand the impact of family ownership and management 
on other firm characteristics (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). In this paper, we suggest that the resource-based 
view may form the basis for suggesting an indirect effect between family ownership and management 
and professional HRM practices. For example, Reid and Adams (2001) find that many family firms use 
less professional HRM practices, and explain this by suggesting such firms have more limited organiza-
tional capabilities. Past research supports the finding that family firms are less complex than non-family 
firms, in that they are often smaller (Daily and Dollinger, 1993; Donckels and Frohlich, 1991, Cromie et 
al., 1995, Westhead and Cowling, 1996). They are also less specialized or departmentalised (Reid and 
Adams, 2001; Cyr et al., 2000). In a study of Irish SMEs, Reid and Adams (2001) find that family busi-
nesses are less likely to have an HRM department. Cyr et al. (2000) find a negative relationship between 
the percentage of the firm owned by the CEO, a variable correlated with family ownership, and the 
presence of an HRM vice- president. Family firms are less likely to use formal accounting and planning 
practices than non-family firm counterparts, even when controlling for size and other factors (Jorissen, 
Laveren, Martens, and Reheul, 2002). Some researchers (e.g. Westhead and Cowling, 1996) suggest 
that it may not be family ownership and/or management per se that influences firm practices and per-
formance, but indirect effects due to the fact that such firms often have more limited resources to in-10   
vest, and choose less technical complex industries, and are thus are more constrained vis-à-vis resources 
available for company growth. In sum, the negative impact of family ownership and management on 
professional HRM practices may result from an indirect effect in that family firms tend to be smaller and 
less complex organizations, and with more limited resources. 
 
To support the premise of an indirect effect based on the resource-based view, it is important not only 
to relate family ownership and management to (smaller) size and (less) complexity but also to demon-
strate the links between size, complexity and other organization characteristics with professional HRM 
practices and to the resource based view. The remainder of this section provides a brief overview of this 
literature although it is beyond the scope of this paper to cover this literature exhaustively. 
 
Relationship between firm size and professional HRM practices 
As mentioned in the introduction, the link between firm size and professional HRM practices is well es-
tablished. Most professional HRM practices require considerable development costs (Klaas et al., 2000). 
This results in a cost advantage for larger firms, which is strengthened by the limited supply of financial 
resources of many small firms. Company growth theories (Chandler and McEvoy, 2000; Galbraith, 1973; 
Gnan and Songini, 2003) also note the positive trend between firm size and complexity. As firms in-
crease in size and complexity, they typically develop more layers of management and more formalized 
and/or systematized procedures and policies in order to process information more effectively within the 
organization (Galbraith, 1973). There are various explanations for this finding. For example, larger com-
panies have a greater demand for human resources, and (thus, we assume) therefore a greater demand 
for specific HRM practices such as recruitment, selection and performance appraisal. This stimulates 
more professional development of these practices. 
 
In attempts to explain these patterns, some scholars argue that an informal approach is more suited to 
the small firm. For instance, Hill and Stewart (1999) suggest that smaller firms should be more flexible 
and informal to be able to cope with the higher levels of environmental uncertainty. By contrast, others 
argue that it is lack of foresight and/or resources that leads to less use of professional HRM practices in 
small businesses. For instance, Hendry et al (1991) conclude that owners of small companies view any 
training beyond the level necessary to perform their immediate jobs as a luxury to be provided only 
when the firm is making large profits. And Golhar and Deshpande (1997) argue that a lack of under-
standing of HRM issues by small business owners may be one of the explanations for firm-size differ-
ences in HRM practices. Thus the problem may not only arise from limitations of physical capital but of 
human capital as well. Indirect confirmation of this latter explanation can also be found in results of a 
study of firm size and innovation by Damanpour (1992). In a meta-analysis of data from 20 published 
studies, he finds a strong positive relationship between firm size and innovation, indirectly supporting 
the argument that size is an advantage to firms, providing the resources needed to innovate (Daman-
pour, 1992). These results would appear to counter Hill and Stewart’s argument that smaller size is an 
advantage. 
 
Specialization, formalization and professional HRM practices 
Specialization is typically associated with greater firm size (Bacon et al., 1996; Jackson et al., 1989; 
Wagner, 1997). Employees in smaller firms often have to perform a greater variety of tasks than do em-
ployees in larger firms, and specialists are less likely to be found in smaller firms. Heneman and Berkley 
(1999) confirm this trend within the HRM function. In a random sample of 117 companies with less 
than 100 employees, they find that only 15 have an HRM department. The negative relationship be-
tween firm size and HRM specialization (i.e., the presence of a specific HRM department and/or man-
ager) is also confirmed in other research (Hornsby and Kuratko, 1990; Atkinson and Meager, 1994; Cyr 
et al, 2000). Damanpour provides an explanation for why specialization (or more generally structural 
complexity) is consistent with the resource-based view. “In complex organizations, coalitions of special-
ists in differentiated subunits increase the depth of the knowledge base, which in turn, increases the 
development of new ideas” (Damanpour, 1996, p. 695). In other words, greater specialization is associ-  11 
ated with greater knowledge resources. This assumption is indirectly confirmed by research by Daman-
pour (1996) using a meta-analysis from over 20 published studies showing a positive relationship be-
tween specialization and innovation. 
 
Some research using the resource-based view sees strategic planning as a type of organizational capabil-
ity (Michalisin, Smith, and Kline, 1997; Powell, 1992). Research specifically linking formal business plan-
ning and/or strategic planning to professional HRM practices is quite limited. However, in light of the 
previous discussion, it is logical to infer that firms with the organizational capabilities and resources to 
develop formal plans, are also more likely to have the resources to develop professional HRM practices. 
Furthermore, the availability of a business plan can be interpreted as a characteristic of organizations 
with a relatively long planning horizon. These firms will be more aware of the need to use professional 
HRM practices to build a competent employee base, implying a relatively high perceived value of HRM 
practices by the CEO. In addition, the presence of a formalized plan may reflect overall formalization 
levels in the organization. 
Export strategy and professional HRM practices 
Recent research on exporting links the existence of an export strategy with greater resource availability. 
For instance, Westhead, Wright, and Ucbasaran (2001) conclude that businesses with more resources, 
denser information and contact networks, and considerable management know-how are significantly 
more likely to be exporters (Westhead, Wright, and Ucbasaran, 2001). Also consistent with the re-
source-based view, Julien and Ramangalahy (2003) conclude that SMEs’ limited capacity to acquire in-
formation and use sources is a major factor explaining their low level of involvement and performance in 
export markets. The exporting performance of SMEs is determined in part by their ability to acquire and 
manage foreign market information. Finally, Dhanaraj and Beamish (2003) find that three sets of re-
sources including firm size, enterprise, and technological intensity, are good predictors of the export 
strategy of a firm. In sum, the presence of an export strategy within an SME may provide an indicator of 
an organization’s ability to handle greater complexity and environmental uncertainty, which require ac-
cess to more resources. 
Summary of the resource based view and the family firm 
To summarize the main points of this section, we suggest that especially among SMEs, family ownership 
and management may be negatively associated with professional HRM practices due to resource limita-
tions given their comparatively smaller size and reduced complexity, compared with non-family firms. In 
our study, in addition to firm size, variables which may reflect this reduced complexity include a (less) 
specialized HRM department or staff, less formal planning, and lack of an export strategy.   13 
3 Model  and  Hypotheses 
In this section, we present the model and hypotheses to be tested in our research. The main characteris-
tic of this model is that it distinguishes between a direct and indirect effect of family ownership and 
management on professional HRM practices. (See Figure 1). Hypothesis 1 predicts an indirect (negative) 
relationship between family ownership and management (referred to as the family firm variable in the 
model) and professional HRM practices via certain organization characteristics associated with greater 
complexity and/or richer organizational resources (arrows 1 and 2 in figure 1). The assumptions for this 
hypothesis draw upon resource-based model and the literature on organization complexity and uncer-
tainty to suggest that family firms may use fewer professional HRM practices because they have fewer 
resources (typically being smaller) and therefore are less complex. 
 
 
figure 1  Proposed Model: Influences on Professional HRM Practices 
 
 
Organization 
Characteristics
Family Firm 
 Professional  
HRM Practices   
3
1  2
 
 
 
 
This hypothesis is consistent with a line of research on family firms carried out by Storey and colleagues, 
which found that the differences between family and nonfamily firms often reflect indirect effects based 
on other intervening factors such as firm size and sector (Westhead and Cowling, 1996). We state Hy-
pothesis 1, as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Family firms have less professional HRM practices due to differ-
ences in certain organization characteristics associated with organizational 
complexity an/or resource availability. 
 
To test Hypothesis 1, we include a limited number of variables to represent these organization 
characteristics, including firm size, the presence of formal business plans, HRM specialization either by 
department or individual manager and export strategy.  
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that at least part of the differences in the extent to which professional HRM prac-
tices are used by family and nonfamily firms cannot be attributed to differences in organization com-
plexity or resource availability but rather to a direct effect of the family firm variable consistent with 
agency theory predictions (arrow 3 in Figure 1). We state Hypothesis 2 as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Family firms, even when controlling for certain organization 
characteristics associated with complexity and/or resource availability, are 
likely to have less professional HRM practices than similar non-family firms.   15 
4 Method 
4.1  Sample and data collection 
Data was collected by means of a written questionnaire sent to Dutch small and medium-sized enter-
prises. The questionnaire was developed by the University of Southern Queensland, Australia (Wiesner 
and McDonald, 2001). A first version of the questionnaire was submitted to a sample of 70 Australian 
SMEs, 31 of which responded. The results of this pilot were used to modify the questionnaire. Subse-
quently, it was submitted to several senior Australian academics in HRM for their comments. The revised 
questionnaire was then translated and further revised by Dutch HRM researchers and practitioners. 
A stratified sample plan was drawn distinguishing six sectors (manufacturing, construction, trade and re-
pairs, catering, transport and communication, services) and three size classes (20-49 employees, 50-99 
employees and 100-199 employees). Not all respondents fall within the originally defined sample classes. 
One hundred enterprises have either less than 20 or more than 200 employees. To avoid the loss of 
these observations, we decided to apply the Small Business Administration definition of SMEs (Flanagan 
and Deshpande, 1996), and to include all enterprises with 1 to 500 employees in our analysis. 
 
Four thousand questionnaires were sent, addressed to the CEOs. Seven hundred thirty-six (736) ques-
tionnaires were received, 52% of which were answered by the CEO and 33% by an employee directly 
answering to the CEO, resulting in an 18% response rate. To check for sample selection bias by size and 
sector, we compare the response rates for the 18 strata. There does not appear to be a serious sample 
selection bias by either size or sector. Whether selection is biased by the respondent’s attitude towards 
HRM cannot be determined.
1 
 
Description and construction of variables 
The professional HRM practices scale was developed from a subset of questionnaire items on recruit-
ment practices, selection methods and procedures, compensation, training and development, and ap-
praisal. Each of these items is measured on a 3-point scale (1=no; 2=for some vacancies/jobs; 3=for all 
vacancies/jobs). A list of all items can be found in the Annex. The selected items all represent practices 
that are considered to be in accordance with professional standards and/or published “best practices” 
for approaching that particular area based on judgments by a multinational group of experts from Aus-
tralia and the Netherlands. The professional HRM practices scale was created in three steps. First, a 
separate factor analysis was carried out using Principal Components Analysis and a Varimax rotated so-
lution to identify relevant items for each of the five categories of HRM practices (recruitment, selection, 
compensation, training and development and appraisal. Second, the items selected for inclusion for 
each category was averaged to construct a separate subscale. To determine the reliability of these sub-
scales, Cronbach alpha reliability coefficients were calculated for the selected items. Finally, the profes-
sional HRM practices scale was calculated as an unweighted average of the underlying subscales. 
 
Organization characteristics variables chosen to represent different aspects of organization complexity 
include firm size, HRM specialization, formal business plan and export strategy. Firm size is measured as 
the log (number of employees), including employees with temporary contracts, with no correction for 
part-time work. To measure HRM specialization, respondents were asked two questions: whether or not 
an HRM department was present; and whether or not an HRM manager was present in the firm. These 
questions were then used to construct a dichotomous variable ‘HRM specialization’ where 0=neither 
HRM department nor HRM manager is present; 1=either an HRM department or HRM manager is pre-
sent (or both). To measure the formal business plan variable, respondents were asked whether or not a 
 
1
 Details of sampling can be found in De Kok,Thurik, and Uhlaner (2003). 16   
formal business plan or strategic plan exists (0=no; 1=yes). To measure export strategy, respondents 
were asked whether or not the firm exports (0=no; 1=yes). 
 
The variable family firm was constructed as follows: A company received a score of 1 when it answered 
in the affirmative to both of the following questions: a) members of one family own this business and b) 
members of one family manage this business. No distinction was made between firms with single 
owner-managers and those in which two or more family members own and/or manage the firm. It re-
ceived a score of 0 otherwise. 
 
Finally, certain control variables were measured, including firm age, sector (service sector, trade sector 
and manufacturing sector), franchising (0=no; 1=yes) and the percentage of employees belonging to a 
union (below referred to as unionisation). 
4.2 Data  analysis 
For hypothesis 1, two protocols were used to test for mediating effects of the organization characteris-
tics variables; one proposed by James and Brett (1984) and the second, by Baron and Kenny (1986). Ac-
cording to Baron and Kenny (1986) one can test for the mediating effect of variable m (organization 
characteristics), by first examining the relationship between proposed antecedent x (family firm) and 
consequence y (professional HRM practices), and then investigating the extent to which this relationship 
diminishes (or even vanishes) if mediating variable, m is included in the model. Assuming significant re-
lationships between x and y, x and m, and m and y (using bivariate tests), to support the inference that 
m completely mediates the effect of x on y, the effect of x on y (i.e. the t value for the unstandardized b 
coefficient) should be significant in the model y=f(x) but not in the model y=f(m,x). 
 
Based on the same starting premise of significant bivariate relationships between x and y, x and m, and 
m and y, James and Brett (1984) compare the models, y=f(m) and y=f(m,x). If the added effect of x 
(tested by the significance of the R-squared change when x is added to the first model) is not significant, 
m can be seen as completely mediating the relationship between x and y. Conversely, a significant result 
provides support for a direct effect.  
 
In this study we combine the two protocols by estimating three separate models: y=f(x), y=f(m) and 
y=f(x,m). We assume the presence of a mediating effect when the following requirements are met: a) 
significant effect of m on y in the model y=f(m); b) a significant effect of x on y in the model y=f(x); and 
c) a nonsignificant effect of x on y in the model y=f(m,x). Likewise, we assume the presence of a direct 
effect in the case of a significant effect of x on y in the model y=f(x) in combination with a significant 
added effect of x on y in the model y=f(m,x). 
 
A limitation of the above described protocols is that the relationship between the family firm and or-
ganization characteristics variables are established by looking at bivariate correlations. Since we hy-
pothesize that family firm is related to organization characteristics, other than firm size, we elaborate on 
the protocol as follows: we control for firm size bias by estimating logistic regressions where the other 
organization characteristics (HRM specialization, formal business planning and export strategy) are re-
lated to the family firm variable as well as firm size.   17 
5 Results   
5.1  Scale formation for professional HRM practices 
The average scores, percentiles and reliabilities of the professional HRM practice subscales are presented 
in Table 1. For four of the five subscales, (all but appraisal) Cronbach alpha exceeds .60. According to 
criteria proposed by Nunnaly (1967)
1, the reliabilities for these subscales are acceptable for an explor-
ative study. The reliabilities of these subscales are comparable with those reported by Huselid (1995) 
and Delery and Doty (1996). With a Cronbach alpha of .43, the reliability of the appraisal subscale is un-
satisfactory. Given the importance of this subscale, we nevertheless decided to include it in our study. 
 
 
Table 1 Scores and reliability statistics on subscales of professional HRM practices 
 Recruitment  Selection  Compensation  Training  and 
development 
Appraisal 
Score:         
Mean 1.6  2.0 1.8 1.7 2.0 
10% percentile  1.3  1.5 1.3 1.0 1.3 
90% percentile  2.0  2.8 2.2 2.3 2.7 
Reliability:    
Cronbach alpha  .62  .69 .64 .81 .43 
Valid observations  533  619 621 669 598 
  note: all subscales are defined on the interval [1,3]. 
 
Due to missing data, none of the subscales can be calculated for all firms. This introduces the risk of a 
selection bias. To determine whether such a bias may occur, we examine for each subscale whether the 
respondents to that subscale differ significantly in their average scores on a number of variables com-
pared to the non-respondents
2. No significant differences in firm size are found between respondents 
and non-respondents. What does matter is the position of the respondent within the organization. For 
CEOs, the response rate is significantly lower than for other respondents
3. This holds for all subscales, 
with the exception of the recruitment subscale. A possible explanation for this finding is that the CEO 
takes less time to fill in the complete questionnaire. 
 
The professional HRM practices scale is calculated as an unweighted average of the underlying sub-
scales. The resulting overall HRM scale is defined for 519 enterprises (Cronbach alpha equals .78). 
 
1
 For early stages of basic research, Nunnally (1967) suggested that a Cronbach alpha between .5 and .6 would be suffi-
cient. 
2
 These control variables are size, sector, current working position of the respondent, location of the firm, current tenure 
of the respondent, whether the respondent is (part) owner, whether the company is owned by a family, whether the 
enterprise is member of a franchise organization, if a business plan is available, and the respondent’s gender. 
3
 the response rate is also lower if the respondent has a long tenure with the firm, or is (part) owner of the firm. Since 
ownership, tenure and being CEO are strongly related with each other, these differences in response rate are inter-
preted as confirmations of the CEO-effect. 18   
5.2 Descriptive  and  bivariate statistics 
Table 5 in the Annex reports the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients between the 
major variables in this study. The relationships between each of the organization characteristics variables 
and professional HRM practices are all expected to be positive. This is confirmed by the bivariate correla-
tions between professional HRM practices and all four organization characteristics variables, including 
firm size (r= .41, p<0.01), HRM specialization (r=.43, p<.01), formal business plan (r=.35, p<0.01) and 
export strategy (r=.19, p<.01). 
 
The bivariate correlations between family firm and three of the four organization characteristics vari-
ables are fairly strong, statistically speaking, and negative (with firm size, r=-.27, p<.01; with HRM spe-
cialization, r=-.29, p<.01; with formal business plan, r=-.24, p<.01). The correlation between the family 
firm variable and export strategy is somewhat weaker than for the other three relationships though still 
statistically significant at the .05 level (r=-0.08; p<.05). To control for firm size bias, we estimate three 
logistic regressions, relating three organization characteristics (HRM specialization, formal business plan 
and export strategy) to family firm as well as firm size. In addition, we have included sector dummies as 
control variables (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 Results of logistic regression to examine the relationship between family ownership and 
three indicators of organisational complexity 
 
HRM Specialization
  Formal Business 
plan 
Export Strat-
egy
 
Family firm  -0.78**  -0.75**  -0.32  
Firm Size  1.26**  0.65**  0.22 
      
Firm Age   -0.11  -0.11  0.06 
Trade sector   -0.02  -0.21  -0.22 
Service sector  0.34  -0.09  -1.77** 
Other sector  0.62*  -0.12  -0.49 
      
Goodness of fit measures:       
% predicted correctly
a  70 (54)  71 (67)  72 (73) 
R² (Nagelkerke)  0.29  0.14  0.17 
Chi² test for model parsimony
b  7.79 (0.099)  2.2 (0.70)  71 (0.00) 
Chi² test for model fit
c  161 (0.00)  68 (0.00)  81 (0.00) 
Valid observations  669  660  668 
  *: significant at 5% level 
  **: significant at 1% level 
  a: the reference value (the share of firms with HRM specialization/formal business plan/export strategy) is reported within 
parentheses. 
  b: test for the joint hypothesis that the parameters for age, trade, service and other sectors are equal to zero. Probability 
value within parentheses. 
  c: test for the hypothesis that all included parameters (except constant) are equal to zero. Probability value within 
parentheses. 
  d: the significance of the parameters is based upon both Wald statistics and Likelihood Ratio test statistics. Both test 
statistics lead to the same conclusions. A constant term has been estimated, but is not included in the table. 
 
The results support a broader interpretation of hypothesis 1. That is, it is not just firm size, but other or-
ganization characteristics as well that probably mediate the relationship between the family firm variable   19 
and professional HRM practices. Only for export strategy we find that the relationship with the family 
firm variable is no longer significant, once we control for firm size. 
 
Finally, we note that the bivariate relationship between family firm and professional HRM practices is 
significant and negative (r=-.40; p<.01). 
 
The significance and direction of the relationships between the family firm variable (x), organization 
characteristics (m) and professional HRM practices (y) having been established, we can now test for the 
mediating effect of organization characteristics in the relationship between family firm and professional 
HRM practices. The estimation results of the regression models for y=f(m, c), y=f(x, c) and y=f(m,x,c) are 
presented as Models 1, 2, and 3 in table 3, where c represents additional control variables in the equa-
tion. In addition, the last column in table 3 reports the change in R
2 for two separate analyses (either 
when a block is entered first—without the control variables; or last in the all-variable regression model). 
 
Table 3 Results of ordinary least squares regression analyses on professional HRM practices  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Controls and Organi-
zation characteristics 
Controls and Fam-
ily Firm  
All Variables 
Explanatory Variables  B-value  t-value  B-value  t-value  B-value  t-value 
 
 
￿R
2 
a 
 Organization Characteristics              .30**/ .20** 
          Firm Size (log)   .09  5.16**         .07    4.40**    
          Formal Business Plan   .14  5.51**         .13    5.21**    
          Export strategy   .09  3.26**         .08    3.06**    
          HRM specialization   .16  6.11**         .13    5.28**   
                       
Family Firm      -.23   -9.05**    -.14   -6.01**  .15** /.05** 
           
Controls          .01  /.01 
          Firm Age (log)  -.01    -.58   .00      .19      .00       .14    
          Unionisation (%)   .01  -1.51   .00     -.30     -.01    -1.62   
          Manufacturing sector   .05   1.67   .04    1.03     .05     1.62   
          Service sector   .01     .26  -.02     -.70      .00       .15   
          Franchise   .09   1.65  -.23   -9.05     .09     1.82   
           
Constant  1.25  15.86**  1.91  35.72**   1.38   17.46**   
            
R-square   
Adjusted R-square    
F-statistic 
 .31 
 .30  
22.86** 
 .16 
 .15 
 14.56** 
 .36 
 .35 
 25.78** 
 
  ** p< .001-level;  
  * p< .01-level,  
  # p<.05.a  
  Change in R2 when adding this variable first / last to the model (including all variables, i.e., organization characteristics, 
family firm; controls).Note: B-values refer to the unstandardized coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
 
In a regression that only includes family firm as the independent variable, the unstandardized b coeffi-
cient equals -.23 (p<.01), and this family firm effect explains approximately 15% of the variation in pro-
fessional HRM practices. 
 
Which part of this total family firm effect is mediated by organisational characteristics? This can be de-
termined by looking at the third model reported in table 4. In this full model, the family firm unstan-
dardized b coefficient is -.14 (p<.01). The contribution to the R
2 when family firm is entered last in the 
equation, though reduced in magnitude, is still statistically significant (￿R
2=.05, 
 p<.01). We therefore 20   
accept hypothesis 2, and conclude that a direct effect of the family firm variable on professional HRM 
practices does exist. 
 
In addition, we also accept hypothesis 1, concerning the presence of an indirect effect of the family firm 
variable on professional HRM practices with organization characteristics serving as intervening variables. 
This conclusion follows from the findings that, first of all, family firm is related to each of the organisa-
tion characteristics; secondly, that organization characteristics have a significant effect on professional 
HRM practices (in the first as well as in the third model in table 4); and finally, that the unstandardized b 
coefficient for the family firm variable does decrease (from -.23 to -.14) when the effects of the organi-
zation characteristics are added into the linear regression model. 
5.3 Discussion 
The results from the present study support both hypotheses set forth; namely that firms with family 
ownership and/or management are less likely to use professional HRM practices, and that this may be 
due both to direct and indirect effects of the independent variable. It was argued that direct effects 
might be explained by agency theory and that indirect effects might be explained using the resource 
based view.  Results appear to support, at least partially, both explanations however. In the discussion, 
we examine these premises more closely and discuss additional theories that should be considered in 
future research. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, agency theory provides one explanation for the direct effect. That is, 
the family firm effect is due in part to a decreased (perceived or actual) need for monitoring of the 
management by the ownership, since these may overlap in part, or in their entirety. However, organiza-
tion control theory and institutional theory might also provide useful insights consistent with support for 
a direct effect. As pointed out by Gnan and Songini (2003), organizational control theory points out 
that clan and social control systems are more effective than the bureaucratic and administrative systems 
when strategy, decision making and power in the organization are managed by few people who share 
common values and coordinate themselves by informal relationships (Gnan and Songini, 2003, Mintz-
berg, 1983, Hopwood, 1974). It could be that in family firms, the social interactions among family 
members allow the use of informal and cultural mechanisms that substitute or complement the formal 
administrative systems. However, to test the accuracy of this explanation, future research is needed that 
would measure the effect of different HRM practices on performance. 
 
Institutional theory may also help to explain the direct effect. Whereas agency theory focuses on the re-
lationships between two specific stakeholders of an organisation, institutional theory typically examines 
additional stakeholders. Institutional theorists view organizations as entities that gain legitimacy and 
stakeholder acceptance by conforming to their stakeholders’ expectations (Huselid et al., 1997; Paauwe, 
1998). Examples of stakeholders are governmental institutions, professional organizations and certifying 
bodies (Baron et al., 1988; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). In many industrialized nations, government insti-
tutions frequently play a key role in defining expectations in HRM practices, such as recruiting, selection, 
performance measurement, training, and the administration of compensation and benefits (Paauwe, 
1998). 
 
Williamson (2000) uses institutional theory to develop a strategic model of small business recruitment. In 
particular, he introduces the notion of employer legitimacy, defined as “a generalized perception or as-
sumption held by job applicants that an organization is a desirable, proper or appropriate employer 
given the system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions that exist within an industry” (Williamson, 
2000, p.28). Williamson posits that to the extent an organization’s recruitment procedures and other HR 
policies are viewed as proper and appropriate by potential job applicants, the organization will be seen 
as a legitimate employer. That is, small firms copy HRM practices of larger firms to gain employer legiti-
macy. But within this context, one might argue that the family firm has less need of legitimacy to the 
extent that it attracts family and friends to work for the firm. In addition, employer legitimacy in the   21 
family firm may derive less from the professional manner in which a firm handles its HRM policies than 
from ways in which family ties are managed. 
 
From this discussion, it may be apparent that institutional theory and agency theory may lead to similar 
predictions. For instance, both theories are based on the premise that in family firms, the owner and 
manager stakeholder groups are likely to overlap and thus affect the types of practices in use. Institu-
tional theory provides an additional explanation however for the presence of more informal HRM prac-
tices when not only the owner and manager, but the owner-manager and employee come from the 
same family. In particular, the firm may require less legitimacy from potential employees. 
 
On the other hand, more than half the family firm effect is indeed explained by organization characteris-
tics variables included in our model such as firm size, (presence of a) formal business plan, export strat-
egy and HRM specialization. This is in line with the resource-based view of organizations. In particular, it 
is posited that these variables are likely to reflect greater resource availability and/or organization capa-
bilities within the firm making it easier for the firm to develop professional expertise in HRM practices as 
well. Alternatively, these findings can be explained by the company growth theory, which suggests that 
as a company gets larger, the management task becomes more complex and requires a more profes-
sional approach. These relationships have been extensively documented in the literature (Perren, Berry 
and Partridge, 1999, Deakins, Morrison and Galloway 2002, Gnan and Songini, 2003). Furthermore, 
formal planning and control systems can help a family firm to cope with the challenges of family firm 
continuity as well (Ward, 1987).   23 
6 Conclusions 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine and explain differences in the professional HRM prac-
tices between family and non-family owned and managed firms. We present a model concerning direct 
and indirect effects of family firm characteristics on the use of professional HRM practices. 
 
We find that, based on our sample and model, family firms are less likely to use professional HRM prac-
tices than their counterparts. This family firm effect occurs not only indirectly (since family businesses 
tend to be smaller, and/or less complex than non-family businesses, where complexity stimulates the 
application of professional HRM practices), but also directly. The direct effects are consistent with pre-
dictions consistent with agency theory, which predict less monitoring in the family firm. On the other 
hand, the results cannot rule out other interpretations offered by organization control theory and/or in-
stitutional theory. Furthermore, the indirect family firm effect is consistent with predictions based on the 
resource-based view although once again, alternative interpretations of the findings cannot be ruled 
out. 
 
We have not examined whether it is actually better or worse for family firms to rely upon less profes-
sional HRM practices. Lacking performance data, it is still possible to argue that family firms rely less 
heavily on professional HRM practices because it is unnecessary to do so, especially in many of the small 
firms within this study. Thus, future research is needed to examine relations between the use of profes-
sional HRM practices and performance for small firms, using family firm as a contingency variable. 
   25
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Annex I  Subscales of formal HRM practices 
This annex provides additional information on the HRM subscales used in this study. The 
HRM subscales are defined by a selection of available items in the questionnaire. Each 
of these items is measured on a 3-point scale (no, for some vacancies/jobs, for all va-
cancies/jobs). Table 6 presents the selected items that are used to define the subscales. 
An elaborate discussion of the subscales, including a discussion of the correspondence 
with the results of factor analysis on all items, can be found in De Kok, Uhlaner and 
Thurik (2003). 
Table 4: Items included in subscales 
Subscale   Item 
recruitment  recruitment and selection office 
temporary employment agencies 
Magazines 
Internet 
 
referrals by employees 
  references from other sources 
 open  house 
selection  use of written job descriptions 
 job  analysis 
 psychological  tests 
 interview  panels 
compensation performance  pay 
  (partly) based on job evaluation 
 competitive  wages 
  wages based on acquired skills  
  group incentive programs 
 individual  incentive  programs 
 profit  sharing 
 annual  bonus 
  additional financial benefits, other than pensions (for ex-
ample, insurance and savings arrangements)  
training provided to employees  training and development 
formal training budget available 
  recent introduction of formal training programs 
  recent intensification of existing training programs 
  formal inhouse training by internal staff  
  formal inhouse training by external staff 
  external training  
  management and development training  
appraisal   rating scales 
  management by objectives 
  appraisal conducted by line manager 
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